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RIGHT TO COUNSEL-THE THIRD CIRCUIT DELIVERS INDIGENT CIVIL
LITIGANTS FROM "ExCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES"
I. INTRODUCTION
As a general proposition, there exists no constitutional right to coun-
sel for litigants in civil cases.1 On the contrary, the United States Supreme
Court has stated that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel only attaches
when an accused defendant is threatened with the loss of personal lib-
erty.2 Although the Supreme Court has never directly addressed whether
a constitutional right to counsel exists in civil proceedings, several federal
appellate courts have held that the Constitution does not provide a right
to appointed counsel in civil cases. 3
Federal courts do have statutory authority, however, to request
counsel for indigent litigants in civil proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.4
1. Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18 (1981). Lassiter involved
the termination of parental rights of an indigent who was not represented by coun-
sel. Id. In that case, the Supreme Court discussed the development of the right to
counsel in criminal cases. The Court ultimately concluded that these cases raise
the presumption that a constitutional right to counsel only extends to cases in
which the defendant may be deprived of physical liberty. Id. at 25; see also Howard
B. Eisenberg, Rethinking Prisoner Civil Rights Cases and the Provision of Counsel, 17 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 417, 446-47 (1993) (noting that idea of constitutional right to counsel
in civil cases has been squarely rejected by federal courts); Todd MacFarlane,
Note, Mallard v. United States District Court: Without Imposing Compulsoy Service,
How Can the Legal Profession Meet Indigent's Pressing Needs for Legal Representation ?,
1990 UTAH L. REV. 923, 925 (stating general rule that provision of counsel for
indigents is limited to criminal cases).
2. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25. For a discussion of the facts and holding in Lassiter,
see infra note 29 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir. 1993) (stating that
civil litigants have no constitutional right to appointment of counsel); Fowler v.
Jones, 899 F.2d 1088, 1096 (11th Cir. 1990) ("Appointment of counsel in a civil
case is not a constitutional right."); United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.2d
796, 801 (9th Cir. 1986) ("There is normally... no constitutional right to counsel
in a civil case."); Childs v. Duckworth, 705 F.2d 915, 922 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding
no constitutional right to appointment of counsel unless denial of counsel would
impinge on due process rights); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir.
1980) (noting that defendant could cite no authority supporting existence of con-
stitutional right to counsel in civil cases); Cook v. Bounds, 518 F.2d 779, 780 (4th
Cir. 1975) (holding that appointment of counsel in civil actions allowed only in
exceptional circumstances); Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 1971)
(noting that indigent litigant has no statutory or constitutional right to counsel in
civil case).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1988). The relevant sections of the statute provide:
(a) Any court of the United States may authorize the commence-
ment, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or
criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees and costs or se-
curity therefor, by a person who makes affidavit that he is unable to pay
such costs or give security therefor. Such affidavit shall state the nature of
(1163)
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Congress enacted this statute in 1892, intending to open the courts to
those persons previously denied access due to their inability to pay.5
While federal courts have widely held that § 1915 grants discretionary au-
thority to appoint counsel for indigent civil litigants, 6 circuit courts disa-
gree as to the proper exercise of this discretion. 7
the action, defense or appeal and affiant's belief that he is entitled to
redress ....
(d) The court may request an attorney to represent any such person
unable to employ counsel and may dismiss the case if the allegation of
poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious.
Id.
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the word "request" in
§ 1915(d) to mean that federal district courts do nothave the authority to require
unwilling attorneys to accept pro bono appointments in civil cases. Mallard v.
United States District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). A discussion of this aspect
of § 1915(d), however, is beyond the scope of this Comment. For complete cover-
age of Mallard and its impact, see generally Michael Millemann, Mandatory Pro Bono
in Civil Cases: A Partial Answer to the Right Question. 49 MD. L. Rxv. 18 (1990); Peter
K. Rofes, Ducking the Question: Some Observations on Mallard v. United States District
Court and the Case of the Unwilling Lawyer, 55 BRooK. L. Rxv. 1129 (1990); Kimberly
B. Ward, Request or Require-The Federal Courts' Authority to Appoint Counsel for Indi-
gent Civil Litigants: Mallard v. United States District Court for the Southern District
of Iowa, 36 Lov. L. REV. 235 (1990); Beth M. Coleman, Note, The Constitutionality of
Compulsoy Attorney Service: The Void Left by Mallard, 68 N.C. L. REv. 575 (1990);
MacFarlane, supra note 1;JamesJ. Vinch, Comment, Mallard v. United States Dis-
trict Court: Section 1915(d) and the Appointment of Counsel in Civil Cases, 51 OHIo ST.
LJ. 1001 (1990); Lisa M. Windfelt, Note, Pro Bono Representation-A Lauyer's Statu-
toy Right to 'Just Say No"." The End of Compelled Indigent Representation-Mallard v.
United States District Court, 25 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 647 (1990).
5. 23 CONG. REc. 5199 (1892). Representative Culberson stated:
Mr. Speaker, the effect of this bill, if it should become law, will be to open
the courts of the United States to a class of persons who are now denied
the right of bringing suits in the courts of the United States, that have no
money or property by which to comply with the rules of the courts with
respect to costs.
Id.
6. See, e.g., Lavado, 992 F.2d at 604 ("A district court has discretion to appoint
counsel for an indigent civil litigant."); Rayes v. Johnson, 969 F.2d 700, 702 (8th
Cir.) (explaining that courts may exercise discretion to appoint counsel for indi-
gent civil litigants), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 658 (1992); Hodge v. Police Officers, 802
F.2d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting § 1915(d) gives district judge broad discretion
to decide whether to appoint counsel); Cookish v. Cunningham, 787 F.2d 1, 2 (1st
Cir. 1986) (noting that in appropriate circumstances district court has discretion
to appoint counsel for indigent civil litigants under § 1915(d)); McKeever v. Israel,
689 F.2d 1315, 1318-20 (7th Cir. 1982) (stating district courts have broad discre-
tion to appoint counsel for indigents under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)); Ray v. Robinson,
640 F.2d 474, 477 (3d Cir. 1981) (stating that under § 1915(d) court has discre-
tionary authority to appoint counsel for indigent civil litigants); United States v.
McQuade, 579 F.2d 1180, 1181 (9th Cir. 1978) ("The court does have discretionary
authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) to appoint counsel for an indigent to com-
mence, prosecute, or defend a civil action.").
7. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 451. According to Eisenberg, although the stan-
dards for requesting counsel for a civil litigant are similar in many circuits, some
circuits are more likely than others to appoint counsel. Id.
1164
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The principle disagreement focuses on whether courts should exer-
cise their discretion to appoint counsel for indigent civil litigants.8 A
number of circuits have held that counsel should only be appointed in
"exceptional circumstances."9 While never precisely defining "exceptional
circumstances,"10 courts generally analyze a limited number of factors to
determine whether exceptional circumstances are present." In Tabron v.
Grace,12 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ad-
dressed this issue and expressly rejected the "exceptional circumstances"
standard in favor of a less stringent test.13 As a result, courts in the Third
Circuit may be more likely to request counsel for indigent litigants in civil
proceedings than courts in circuits espousing the "exceptional circum-
stances" standard.
This Comment addresses the appointment of counsel in civil proceed-
ings under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) in the Third Circuit. Part II begins with a
discussion of the evolution of the right to counsel and the nature of the
authority conveyed by the statute.14 Part III then follows this issue's devel-
opment in other circuits. 15 Part IV closely examines the criteria employed
to determine appointments of counsel for indigent civil litigants, which
8. For a discussion of the differing approaches among the circuit courts, see
infra notes 74-138 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Lavado, 992 F.2d at 601; Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1093 (9th
Cir. 1980); Fowler v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1088, 1096 (11th Cir. 1990); Gookish, 787 F.2d
at 2; Cook v. Bounds, 518 F.2d 779, 780 (4th Cir. 1975); Branch v. Cole, 686 F.2d
264, 265 (5th Cir. 1982). In short, the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and Elev-
enth Circuits have all held that counsel for indigent litigants should only be ap-
pointed in exceptional circumstances.
10. Branch, 686 F.2d at 266. According to the Fifth Circuit, a complete defini-
tion of exceptional circumstances is not practical. Id. Rather, the existence of
exceptional circumstances in this circuit turns on two basic factors that will vary
among cases: (1) the complexity and type of the case; and (2) the indigent plain-
tiff's abilities. Id. Further, the trial court retains discretion to make these determi-
nations. Id.
11. Id. These factors generally include the abilities of the litigant bringing
the case, as well as the complexity and type of case. Id. Other factors that courts
have used to determine whether exceptional circumstances exist are the indigent's
ability to conduct the necessary factual investigation, as well as whether the evi-
dence will consist in large part of conflicting testimony. Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691
F.2d 209, 213 (5th Cir. 1982). For a more complete discussion of the factors ap-
plied by courts using the exceptional circumstances approach, see infra notes 76-
111 and accompanying text.
12. 6 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1306 (1994).
13. Id. at 155. For a more detailed discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis in
Tabron, see infra notes 170-89 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the development of a constitutional right to counsel,
see infra notes 17-37 and accompanying text. For an overview of the federal courts'
position on the nature of the authority conveyed by § 1915(d), see infra notes 43-
60 and accompanying text.
15. For an examination of the exceptional circumstances approach, see infra
notes 76-111 and accompanying text. For a discussion of a less stringent approach
to the appointment of counsel in civil cases, see infra notes 112-38 and accompany-
ing text.
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were most recently announced by the Third Circuit in Tabron.16 Finally,
this Comment concludes by suggesting that this new standard may in-
crease appointments of counsel for indigent civil litigants.
II. HISTORICAL BACKDROP
A. Development of a Constitutional Right to Counsel
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to
counsel. 17 The United States Supreme Court first applied this right to an
indigent criminal defendant in Powell v. Alabama.18 In Powell, seven Afri-
can-American defendants were charged with the rapes of two white girls.
Tried and convicted, the defendants were never asked whether they could
employ counsel themselves or whether they wanted court-appointed coun-
sel.19 On appeal, the defendants argued this error denied them their
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, along with the customary opportunity
for trial preparation.2 0 The Court held that the Sixth Amendment re-
quires the federal courts to appoint counsel to represent indigent defend-
ants accused of capital crimes.2 1
The Court applied this right to the states through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Gideon v. WainwrightY22 In
Gideon, the defendant was charged with a misdemeanor in Florida state
16. For a detailed look at the Third Circuit's approach to the appointment of
counsel under § 1915(d), see infra notes 139-89 and accompanying text.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." Id.
18. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
19. Id. at 52. The Supreme Court noted that, given a reasonable opportunity,
there was a good chance that the defendants would have been represented by able
counsel. Id. In fact, shortly after defendants' conviction, counsel appeared on
their behalf. Id. Of particular importance was the fact that the defendants were
not Alabama residents and were given very little time or opportunity to contact
family or friends in surrounding states. Id. at 52-53.
20. Id. at 50. The defendants argued three specific Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection and due process violations. Id. First, the defendants argued they
did not receive a fair, deliberate and impartial trial. Id. Second, they argued the
court denied them the right to counsel, complete with the .opportunity of trial
preparation and consultation. Id. Finally, the defendants argued that members of
their own race had been systematically excluded from the juries before which they
were tried. Id. The Supreme Court, however, only considered the second issue of
denial of counsel. Id.
21. Id. at 66. The Court reasoned that the provision of notice and hearing is
essential to due process. Id. at 68. The right to be heard, however, would have
little meaning if the right to be heard by counsel was not included. Id. at 69. Even
an intelligent and educated person, the Court reasoned, lacks the skill and knowl-
edge to present his own defense. Id. Moreover, in the case of one who is ignorant,
illiterate or otherwise unable to defend himself, the Court held that due process
requires the court to assign counsel, whether requested or not. Id. at 71. For
further discussion of the Court's holding in Powe, see MacFarlane, supra note 1, at
924.
22. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
1166 [Vol. 39: p. 1163
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court and was refused his request for court-appointed counsel.2 3 Tried
and convicted without counsel, the defendant filed a petition for habeas
corpus, alleging denial of his constitutional rights.2 4 After granting certio-
rari, the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of counsel for criminal defendants constitutes a fundamental
right imposed upon the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.2 5
The scope of these cases, however, remains unclear when indigent
litigants require court-appointed counsel in civil proceedings. 26 Having
never directly addressed the issue,2 7 the Supreme Court in Lassiter v. De-
partment of Social Services,28 stated the general proposition that "an indigent
litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may be
deprived of his physical liberty."2 9 The federal circuit courts of appeal
23. Id. at 336. The defendant was charged with breaking and entering with
intent to commit a misdemeanor. Id. This offense constituted a felony under Flor-
ida law. Id. at 336-37. The trial court refused to appoint counsel on the grounds
that counsel could only be appointed when a defendant is charged with a capital
crime. Id. at 337.
24. Id. Defendant filed this habeas corpus petition in the Florida Supreme
Court, arguing that the trial court's refusal to appoint counsel constituted a denial
of his constitutional rights. Id. The Florida Supreme Court denied the petition
without issuing an opinion. Id.
25. Id. at 342. The Court stated:
From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws
have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards
designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every de-
fendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized
if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a
lawyer to assist him.
Id. at 344. Therefore, the Court held that an indigent criminal defendant has a
fundamental right to assistance of counsel and that the denial thereof constitutes a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.; see also WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE
RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 27-79 (1955) (providing lengthy discus-
sion of early development of Sixth Amendment right to counsel); ALFREDO GARCIA,
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT IN MODERN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 3-14 (1992) (review-
ing historical development of Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal
cases); SHELDON KRANTZ ET AL., RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES: THE MAN-
DATE OF Argersinger v. Hamlin 19-23 (1976) (explaining historical background of
constitutional right to counsel in criminal cases).
26. MacFarlane, supra note 1, at 925.
27. Id.
28. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
29. Id. at 26-27. Lassiter involved a child custody suit. Following the peti-
tioner's conviction for second degree murder, the North Carolina Department of
Social Services requested termination of her parental rights. Id. at 21. At the hear-
ing, petitioner lacked representation by legal counsel. The court did not appoint
counsel, nor did petitioner claim that she was indigent. Id. at 22. The court pro-
ceeded with the hearing, finding that the petitioner had ample time and opportu-
nity to retain counsel. Id. After the court determined that termination of parental
rights would be in the best interest of the child, the petitioner appealed, arguing
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entided her to the
assistance of counsel. Id. at 24. The Supreme Court held that the Constitution
does not require the appointment of counsel for indigent litigants in every paren-
tal status termination proceeding. Id. at 31. Rather, the Court stated that an indi-
5
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have also consistently held that indigent litigants have no constitutional
right to counsel in proceedings.5 0
In United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land,31 for example, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted that the constitutional re-
quirements for appointment of counsel in criminal proceedings differ
greatly from those in civil proceedings.3 2 That case involved a complaint
filed by the United States to establish just compensation for land taken by
the government.33 Appearing pro se, the defendant prevailed at the first
trial and received a large cash award from the jury.8 4 After the award was
overturned on appeal, the defendant moved for appointment of coun-
sel.35 The court denied this motion without explanation and without ar-
ticulating the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915.36 Remanding the case for
a determination of the defendant's indigence, the court stated that
"[flederal criminal defendants facing imprisonment are entitled to repre-
sentation of counsel, and the power of courts to appoint counsel for such
defendants is thus necessary to preserve their constitutional rights. There
is normally, however, no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case."
3 7
gent litigant has the right to counsel only when a loss may result in a deprivation of
physical liberty. Id. at 27. As a result, because the loss of physical liberty was not a
threat in this case, the litigant was not entitled to have counsel appointed on her
behalf. Id. According to the Court, in cases where a litigant cannot be deprived of
his or her physical liberty, a presumption exists against the appointment of coun-
sel. Id. See generally William L. Dick, Jr., Note, The Right to Appointed Counsel for
Indigent Civil Litigants: The Demands of Due Process, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 627
(1989). The author advocates dispensing with the Lassiter presumption in cases
where "the interests of the indigent litigant, although not involving his personal
liberty, are fundamental and compelling." Id. at 628. Fundamental fairness and
due process cases demand a presumption in favor of appointing counsel in such
cases. Id. For further discussion of Lassiter, see Eric Buermann, Note, Lassiter v.
Department of Social Services: The Right to Counsel in Parental Termination Proceed-
ings, 36 U. MiAljI L. REv. 337 (1982); Kevin W. Shaughnessy, Note, Lassiter v. De-
partment of Social Services: A New Interest Balancing Test for Indigent Civil Litigants,
32 CATH. U. L. REv. 261 (1982); Peter E. Van Runkle, Comment, Lassiter v. Depart-
ment of Social Services: What it Means for the Indigent Divorce Litigant, 43 OHIo ST.
LJ. 969 (1982).
30. For a list of these cases, see supra note 3.
31. 795 F.2d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 1986).
32. Id. The Constitution requires appointment of counsel for criminal de-
fendants facing trial, whereas no analogous constitutional right to counsel exists in
civil cases. Id.
33. Id. at 797.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 797-98.
37. Id. at 801. For a list of circuit court cases rejecting the notion of a constitu-
tional right to counsel in civil cases, see supra note 3. For a discussion of the devel-
opment of the right to appointed counsel in criminal cases and the attempt to
establish this right in civil cases, see Dick, supra note 29, at 628-60.
1168 [Vol. 39: p. 1163
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B. Enactment and Effect of 28 U.SC. § 1915 ,
Despite the lack of a constitutional right to counsel in a civil proceed-
ing, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 grants the federal courts authority to appoint coun-
sel for indigent civil litigants.38 Enacted in 1892, the statute enables
indigents to initiate actions in federal courts.5 9 The statute also allows
indigents to file federal civil actions without paying a filing fee.4° Con-
gress passed this first informa pauperis#' statute with the admirable motive
of opening the courts to all citizens.
42
Despite these lofty ideals, the informa pauperis statute has not resulted
in a federal statutory right to counsel in civil cases. 48 Rather, the circuit
courts of appeals generally agree that while the statute gives a court the
power to request counsel for indigent civil litigants, that power remains
discretionary.44 A case widely cited for this proposition is Peterson v. Nad-
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988). For the text of the statute, see supra note 4.
The statute basically provides that any suit, civil or criminal, may be brought with-
out the payment of fees and costs by any person unable to pay and that a court may
appoint counsel to represent an indigent person. The idea that the poor should
also be afforded access to the courts is not new. Instead, this idea can be traced
well into the past, as far back as Magna Carta. Stephen M. Feldman, Indigents in the
Federal Courts: The In Forma Pauperis Statute-Equality and Frivolity, 54 FoRDHAM L.
REV. 414, 414 (1985). The relevant section of Magna Carta reads: "To no one will
We sell, to none will We deny or delay, right or justice." Magna Carta ch. 40,
reprinted in A.E. DicK HowARD, MAGNA CARTA: TEXT AND COMMENTARY 15 (1964).
According to the author of the commentary, chapter 40 requires that justice must
be available on unbiased terms to all classes of persons. Id. In stating that the
courts should be open to both the rich and poor, this section certainly applies in
modern times. Id.
39. Ward, supra note 4, at 237 (stating that "[§ 11915(d) was designed to en-
able persons unable to afford legal representation to avail themselves of the
courts").
40. Id. at 236. For the text of the statute, see supra note 4.
41. According to Black's Law Dictionary, in forma pauperis is defined as:
In the character or manner of a pauper. Describes permission given to a
poor person (i.e. indigent) to proceed without liability for court fees or
costs. An indigent will not be deprived of his rights to litigate and appeal;
if the court is satisfied as to his indigence he may proceed without incur-
ring costs or fees of court.
BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 779 (6th ed. 1990). For the procedure by which a party
may proceed in forma pauperis, see rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
42. H.R. REP. No. 1079, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1892). "Will the Government
allow its courts to be practically closed to its own citizens, who are conceded to
have valid and just rights, because they happen to be without the money to ad-
vance pay to the tribunals of justice?" Id. For another insight into the motive of
the legislature, see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
43. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 448. Eisenberg noted that prisoners do not
have a federal statutory right to appointed counsel in civil cases. Id.
44. Rayes v. Johnson, 969 F.2d 700, 702 (8th Cir.) ("Although a civil litigant
has no constitutional or statutory right to a court appointed attorney, the district
court may make such an appointment at its discretion."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 658
(1992); Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 1986) (allowing district
court judge broad discretion in deciding whether to appoint counsel under 28
19941 1169
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ler.45 This case involved a federal prisoner's claim that his former attorney
wrongfully sold his automobile after the plaintiff went to prison. 46 The
district court denied the plaintiff's request for appointment of counsel.
4 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the
district court, holding that the circumstances justified the appointment of
counsel. 48 The Eighth Circuit went on to note that the district court over-
looked the express provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 when it denied the
plaintiff's request for counsel. 4 9 According to the Eighth Circuit, federal
courts possess the statutory power to appoint counsel for indigent civil
litigants if, in their discretion, the circumstances so warrant.50 This power
exists even though indigents possess no express statutory or constitutional
right to appointed counsel in a civil case. 5 1
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reiterated
this reasoning in McKeever v. IsraeL52 In McKeever, an indigent prisoner
sued a correctional officer and warden on the grounds that the prison's
policy of limiting the amount of inmate mail violated his constitutional
U.S.C. § 1915(d)); Cookish v. Cunningham, 787 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1986) (explain-
ing that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) gives district court discretion to appoint counsel for
indigent civil litigants); McCarthy v. Weinberg, 753 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir. 1985)
(emphasizing that under § 1915(d) district court has considerable discretion over
appointment of counsel); Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160,163 (4th Cir. 1984)
(emphasizing that power to appoint counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) is discre-
tionary); McKeever v. Israel, 689 F.2d 1315, 1318 (7th Cir. 1982) (stating that there
is no question but that under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) district courts have broad discre-
tion to appoint counsel for indigents); Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885, 886 (7th
Cir. 1981) (holding that district court has broad discretion to appoint counsel for
indigents under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)); Rayv. Robinson, 640 F.2d 474, 477 (3d Cir.
1981) (noting that § 1915(d) grants district court discretion to appoint counsel).
45. 452 F.2d 754 (8th Cir. 1971).
46. Id. at 755.
47. Id. The plaintiff, who was serving a federal prison term at Leavenworth
Penitentiary, proceeded in forma pauperis, seeking $6,035 in compensatory dam-
ages and $5,000 in punitive damages. Id. Citing his incarcerated status and pov-
erty, the plaintiff requested that the district court appoint an attorney to represent
him. Id. at 756. The district court denied this request, stating that it had no power
to appoint counsel in a civil case. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 757. The court went on to point out that along with other courts of
appeals, it regularly makes such appointments in habeas corpus and civil rights
cases. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. The court found that the case's particular circumstances required the
court to appoint counsel. Id. Because the plaintiff was indigent and incarcerated,
he could not properly investigate the facts of the case. Id. at 758. Further, the
plaintiff's incarcerated status precluded any possibility of obtaining evidence. Id.
The appearance of counsel at all proceedings, however, would have aided the
plaintiff and the court. Id. As a result, the court held that the district court's
failure to appoint counsel constituted an abuse of its discretion under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(d). Id.
52. 689 F.2d 1315 (7th Cir. 1982).
1170 [Vol. 39: p. 1163
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rights. 53 While the plaintiff was granted in forma pauperis status, the dis-
trict court denied his request for counsel.M On appeal, the Seventh Cir-
cuit held that the trial court's failure to recognize its discretionary power
under § 1915 constituted an abuse of that discretion. 55 After citing the
statutory language, the appellate court concluded that § 1915(d) clearly
gives a district court broad discretion to appoint counsel for indigent
litigants. 56
The Ninth Circuit has also followed this line of reasoning. In United
States v. McQuade,5 7 the government brought an action to foreclose tax
liens on real property. The district court denied defendants' request for
counsel representation at the oral hearing on the government's motion
for summary judgment.58 The district court judge refused to appoint
counsel, stating the court had no authority to appoint counsel in a civil
proceeding.59 Citing § 1915, the Ninth Circuit held that this ruling consti-
tuted an error of law: "The court does have discretionary authority under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) to appoint counsel for an indigent to commence,
prosecute, or defend a civil action."
6 °
53. Id. at 1316. Specifically, the prisoner alleged that a prison policy that pro-
hibited any prisoner rom taking more than twelve pieces of social or legal mail
with him when he left the prison violated his First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights. Id. Additionally, the prisoner alleged that his property had been lost,
destroyed or stolen in violation of his Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. Id. The prisoner sought a declaratory judgment that these actions violated
his constitutional rights and asked the court to enjoin the property and mail poli-
cies. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1320.
56. Id. at 1318. The trial court in McKeever failed to appoint counsel on four
separate occasions. Id. On one of these occasions, the trial court judge stated,
"[w] ith respect to plaintiff's request for appointment of counsel, the Court wishes
to advise plaintiff that it has no authority to provide compensation for counsel in
civil cases. Therefore, the Court declines plaintiff's request to appoint counsel in
this action." Id. On another occasion, the district court judge stated that the court
lacked authority to appoint counsel in a civil action such as the case at bar. Id. at
1319. According to the court of appeals, the district court failed entirely to exer-
cise its discretion under § 1915 because it did not recognize its authority to ap-
point counsel. Id. The trial court's failure to exercise its discretion constituted an
abuse of discretion. Id. at 1320.
57. 579 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1978).
58. Id. at 1180-81.
59. Id. at 1180. When the government filed this action to foreclose tax liens,
defendants filed an answer and requested that counsel be appointed to assist
them. Without making any specific allegations of poverty, defendants alleged that
they were not able to retain counsel. Id. At the oral hearing on the government's
motion for summary judgment, the defendants again requested the appointment
of counsel. Id. The district court judge stated: "I do not have the authority to
[appoint counsel]. This is a civil action." Id.
60. Id. at 1181. The court went on to state, however, that motions for ap-
pointment of counsel are only granted in exceptional circumstances. Id. Because
the trial court failed to recognize its authority to appoint counsel under § 1915(d),
the trial court did not base its refusal on any finding that exceptional circum-
stances did not exist. Id. Accordingly, the appeals court remanded the case for a
1994] 1171
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III. ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE APPLICATION OF 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)
A. Appealability
While § 1915(d) grants courts discretionary authority to appoint
counsel for indigent civil litigants, courts do not always exercise that dis-
cretion, as evidenced by the cases discussed above. This situation raises
the issue of the appealability of a court's denial of a request for counsel.
Because no statute formally provides for appeal of a denial of appoint-
ment of counsel, review of such denials must satisfy the requirements of 28
U.S.C. § 1291 (hereinafter "final judgment rule"). 6 1
The final judgment rule creates federal appellate court jurisdiction
over final decisions of the district courts. 62 The United States Supreme
Court defines a final decision as one that "ends the litigation on the merits
and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." s6 Nev-
ertheless, certain exceptions to the final judgment rule arise, such as the
writ of mandamusM and the interlocutory order.65 Another exception,
the collateral order doctrine, provides another avenue for immediate ap-
peal of orders. The doctrine only applies in claims of right. Additionally,
in order to invoke the doctrine, the claims must be sufficiently independ-
determination of whether exceptional circumstances existed and for an opportu-
nity for the trial court to exercise its statutory discretion. Id.
61. Jeffrey D. Hanslick, Decisions Denying the Appointment of Counsel and the Final
Judgment Rule in Civil Rights Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 782, 783 (1992). The
statute provides that "[tihe courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals
from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States .... except where
a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court." 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988).
62. Hanslick, supra note 61, at 783.
63. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 373 (1981); see also
Hanslick, supra note 61, at 784.
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (a), (b) (1988). The statute provides in pertinent part:
(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Acts of Congress
may issue all writs necessary and appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.
(b) An alternative writ or rule nisi may be issued by a justice or judge of a
court which has jurisdiction.
Id.
65. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1988) provides for the interlocutory order exception:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise
appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order
involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the
order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation,
he shall so state in writing such order. The Court of Appeals which would
have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its discre-
tion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made
to it within ten days after the entry of the order: Prvided, however, That
application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the
district court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or ajudge
thereof shall so order.
1172 [Vol. 39: p. 1163
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ent of the case such that appellate consideration need not be delayed until
the entire case is adjudicated.66
In Flanagan v. United States,67 the Supreme Court addressed the collat-
eral order doctrine with respect to an order disqualifying counsel. In
Ranagan, four police officers were indicted by a federal grand jury for
committing civil rights offenses and for conspiracy to deprive citizens of
their civil rights.68 The officers retained joint counsel even though the
indictment did not charge all of the officers with the same offenses.69
Three of the officers moved to sever their cases from the fourth and
moved to dismiss the conspiracy count. The government then moved to
dismiss counsel from joint representation. 70 The district court granted
the motion to disqualify and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit affirmed, noting that the disqualification order was a collat-
eral order and therefore appealable before trial.71 Holding that the order
disqualifying counsel did not meet the requirements of the collateral or-
der doctrine, the Supreme Court reversed. 72
The denial of a request for counsel implicates a closely related issue.
The federal courts of appeals do not agree that a denial of a request for
counsel can be immediately appealed under the collateral order doc-
trine. 73 The Federal, Fifth, Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals
allow immediate appeals from decisions denying the appointment of
counsel under the collateral order doctrine.7 4 By contrast, the First,
66. Hanslick, supra note 61, at 786. The collateral order doctrine was an-
nounced by the United States Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). In Cohen, an action was brought against the
managers and directors of a corporation, alleging a conspiracy to enrich them-
selves at the corporation's expense. Id. at 543. The district court failed to apply a
newly-enacted statute which would have made the plaintiff liable for reasonable
expenses and attorneys' fees if he failed to prove his complaint. Id. at 544-45. The
Third Circuit reversed on an immediate appeal. Id. at 545. The Supreme Court
affirmed and found that the district court's order refusing to apply the statute was
appealable. Id. According to the Supreme Court, a collateral order is "that small
class which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to,
rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independ-
ent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the
whole case is adjudicated." Id. at 546.
67. 465 U.S. 259 (1984).
68. Id. at 260-61. According to the indictment, the police officers conspired
to make arrests without probable cause and had abused and unlawfully arrested
eight people. Id. at 261.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 261-62.
71. Id. at 262.
72. Id. at 263.
73. Hanslick, supra note 61, at 787.
74. See, e.g., Lariscey v. United States, 861 F.2d 1267, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(holding denial of request for appointment of counsel under § 1915 (d) is immedi-
ately reviewable), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2997 (1993);Jackson v. Dallas Police Dep't,
811 F.2d 260, 261 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating denial of motion for appointment of
counsel is appealable as final order); Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y of San Diego,
1994] 1173
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Third, Fourth,, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals have held that denials of appointment of counsel do not fulfill the
requirements of the collateral order doctrine and are not immediately
appealable. 75
B. Exceptional Circumstances
The circuit courts lack consistency as to the circumstances under
which counsel should be appointed. Several circuits have clearly stated
that counsel should only be appointed in "exceptional circumstances."
76
662 F.2d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating orders denying appointment of coun-
sel are appealable as collateral order).
75. See, e.g., Appleby v. Meachum, 696 F.2d 145, 146 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding
denial of motion for appointment of counsel is not appealable as collateral order);
Smith-Bey v. Petsock, 741 F.2d 22, 24 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating order denying ap-
pointment of counsel does not meet requirements of Cohen collateral order test);
Miller v. Simmons, 814 F.2d 962, 967 (4th Cir.) (holding order denying appoint-
ment of counsel not immediately appealable), cert. denied, Welch v. Smith, 484 U.S.
903 (1987); Henry v. City of Detroit Manpower Dep't, 763 F.2d 757, 761 (6th Cir.)
(emphasizing district court orders denying appointment of counsel do not fit into
"collateral order" exception), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1036 (1985); Randle v. Victor
Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064, 1067 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding order denying
appointment of counsel appealable only from final judgment); Cotner v. Mason,
657 F.2d 1390, 1391-92 (10th Cir. 1981) (finding order denying appointment of
counsel not immediately appealable because order would not cause crucial collat-
eral claims to be lost and such order would be fully reviewable after final judg-
ment); Hodges v. Department of Corrections, 895 F.2d 1360, 1361 (11th Cir. 1990)
(stating denial of motion for appointment of counsel did not fall within exception
to Cohen requirements and therefore was not immediately appealable). For a com-
plete discussion of the collateral order doctrine and § 1915(d), see Hanslick, supra
note 61, at 782-91 (explaining generally collateral order doctrine and its relation-
ship to motions for appointment of counsel under § 1915(d)); Nicholas Swerdloff,
Note, Denial of a Pro Se Litigant's Motion to Appoint Counsel: The Preclusive Effect of
Immediate Review, 50 FoRDHAM L. Rv. 1399, 1400 (1982) (suggesting that refusing
review of indigent's motion for appointed counsel thwarts intent behind § 1915 (d)
to provide equal access to judicial system); James P. Weygandt, Note, Motions for
Appointment of Counsel and the Collateral Order Doctrine, 83 MIc4. L. Rxv. 1547, 1569
(1985) (suggesting that immediate review is justified to prevent hardship imposed
when indigent litigants are denied appointed counsel).
76. See, e.g., Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 606 (6th Cir. 1993) (justifying
appointment of counsel only in exceptional circumstances); Fowler v. Jones, 899
F.2d 1088, 1096 (11th Cir. 1990) (requiring exceptional circumstances for ap-
pointment of counsel in civil action); Cookish v. Cunningham, 787 F.2d 1, 2 (1st
Cir. 1986) (requiring demonstration of exceptional circumstances to justify ap-
pointment of counsel); Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 1984)
(finding that refusal to appoint counsel is abuse of discretion when exceptional
circumstances exist); Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 213 (5th Cir. 1982) (not-
ing that appointment of counsel is appropriate when exceptional circumstances
exist); Branch v. Cole, 686 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that appointment
of counsel is justified only when exceptional circumstances are present); Aldabe v.
Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 1980) (limiting court's power to appoint
counsel in civil cases to exceptional circumstances); Cook v. Bounds, 518 F.2d 779,
780 (4th Cir. 1975) (agreeing with other circuit decisions that counsel should only
be appointed in exceptional circumstances); United States v. Madden, 352 F.2d
792, 794 (9th Cir. 1965) ("In civil actions for damages, appointment of counsel
1174
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit followed this
approach in Cook v. Bounds.77 The Cook court held that the plaintiff failed
to show the existence of exceptional circumstances, and thus upheld the
district court's order denying the appointment of counsel.78 The plain-
tiff, a life-term prisoner, was involved in ajail break with twelve other pris-
oners. 79 After his recapture, he filed a civil rights action regarding the
conditions of his confinement.80 Prior to trial, the prisoner plaintiff
moved for the appointment of counsel.8 1 The court denied the motion,
holding that no exceptional circumstances existed to justify such an ap-
pointment.8 2 The court, however, gave no guidance as to what consti-
tuted exceptional circumstances. 83
Likewise, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
Branch v. Cole,84 stated that "[n ] o comprehensive definition of exceptional
circumstances is practical."8 5 Instead, the Branch court stated that two fac-
tors should determine the existence of exceptional circumstances: (1) the
ability of the individual bringing the case; and (2) the type and complexity
of the case.86 Branch involved an alleged civil rights violation where the
prisoner claimed that the correctional officers used excessive force.87 The
court, however, never examined whether exceptional circumstances were
present under the announced factors.8 8 Instead, the court noted that the
should be allowed only in exceptional cases."); see also Eisenberg, supra note 1, at
451. According to Eisenberg, the underlying suggestion of the cases in these cir-
cuits is that counsel should not be appointed in an unexceptional prisoner case.
Id. As a result of this reluctance, several circuits never assign counsel in civil cases.
Id. at 452.
77. 518 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1975).
78. Id. at 780 ("[We agree with the district judge that ih this case no such
[exceptional] circumstances are present.").
79. Id.
80. Id. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged: "(1) lack of adequate medical treat-
ment, (2) interference with his right of access to the courts, (3) improper food and
living conditions, and (4) the taking of his property ($7.20) without due process of
law." Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. The court stated that "it is well-settled that in civil actions the appoint-
ment of counsel should be allowed only in exceptional cases." Id. (citing United
States v. Madden, 352 F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1965)). The court went on to agree with
the district court's determination that no exceptional circumstances existed with-
out analyzing or applying the facts of the case to the standard of exceptional cir-
cumstances. Id.
83. Id.
84. 686 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1982).
85. Id. at 266.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 265. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the officers handcuffed
his wrists unnecessarily and too tightly. Id. Further, the plaintiff alleged he was
grabbed by the neck and his handcuffed arms were pulled up far behind his neck.
Id. Plaintiff claimed that this use of force resulted in injury to his hands, wrists and
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discretion to determine the appointment of counsel is fixed at the trial
court level.8 9 Nevertheless, because the trial court denied the prisoner's
request for counsel due to a lack of attorneys willing to take uncompen-
sated appointments, the court of appeals remanded for reconsideration of
the appointment of counsel under the exceptional circumstances
standard.9 0
Similarly, in Aldabe v. Aldabe,9 1 the Ninth Circuit refused to appoint
counsel for a plaintiff who alleged a deprivation of her civil rights in a
divorce proceeding, finding no exceptional circumstances present to jus-
tify such appointment.9 2 Likewise, the Sixth Circuit in Lavado v. Keohane9 3
upheld the denial of counsel to a former federal prisoner who alleged
violation of his constitutional rights when prison officials opened his
mail. 94 The circuit court concluded that the district court was correct in
finding a lack of exceptional circumstances warranting the appointment
of counsel.95 This time, however, the Sixth Circuit gave additional gui-
dance as to the meaning of "exceptional circumstances." The Lavado
court stated that the inquiry will usually include an examination of the
type of case, a determination of the plaintiff's ability to represent himself
and an analysis of the level of complexity of the legal and factual issues
involved.96
Likewise, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in
Cookish v. Cunningham,97 followed the exceptional circumstances ap-
proach and outlined a list of the factors to be considered in a case-by-case
analysis.98 According to the Cookish court, factors to be weighed in the
89. Id., at 266. The prisoner was granted leave to proceed in forma paupeis,
and twice moved to have counsel appointed to assist him. Id. at 265. The magis-
trate denied the plaintiff's motions for appointment of counsel, citing the diffi-
culty of finding lawyers to accept such assignments and the lack of entitlement to
such an appointment. Id. at 265-66.
90. Id.
91. 616 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1980).
92. Id. at 1093; see also United States v. Madden, 352 F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1965).
In Madden, a prisoner filed an action alleging infringement of his federal civil
rights. Madden, 352 F.2d at 793. The district court dismissed the plaintiff's motion
for appointment of an attorney, reasoning that it had no authority to appoint
counsel in a civil action. Id. The appeals court disagreed, finding such authority
in 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Id. Nevertheless, the court remanded the case for clarifica-
tion, noting that "[i] n civil actions for damages, appointment of counsel should be
allowed only in exceptional cases." Id. at 794.
93. 992 F.2d 601 (6th Cir. 1993).
94. Id. at 604. The plaintiff alleged that numerous letters and packages
marked "special mail" were opened outside his presence in violation of his First,
Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Id.
95. Id. at 606.
96. Id. Additionally, the court noted that appointment of counsel remains
inappropriate where the litigant's claims are frivolous or when the chance of suc-
cess is extremely slim. Id. (quoting Mars v. Hansberry, 752 F.2d 254, 256 (6th Cir.
1985)).
97. 787 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986).
98. Id. at 3.
1176 [Vol. 39; p. 1163
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determination include: (1) the indigent's ability to conduct an investiga-
tion; (2) the indigent's capability of presenting the case; and (3) the rela-
tive complexity of the issues involved.99 Applying those factors, the court
in Cookish found that no exceptional circumstances existed to justify the
appointment of counsel.100
Occasionally, the application of these factors has resulted in a finding
of exceptional circumstances. 10 1 For example, in Whisenant v. Yuam, 102
the Fourth Circuit found that exceptional circumstances existed where a
prisoner was denied appointment of counsel in his civil rights action for
denial of adequate medical care.1 03 The court relied specifically on the
plaintiff's lack of education in legal matters, his incarcerated status
preventing contact with witnesses, the sharp conflict in testimony and the
plaintiff's lack of training in cross-examination. 10 4 The combination of
these factors convinced the court that exceptional circumstances justified
the appointment of counsel.1 05
99. Id. In support of the factors determining exceptional circumstances, the
Cookish court cites Childs v. Duckworth, 705 F.2d 915, 922 (7th Cir. 1981), Maclin
v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885, 888 (7th Cir. 1981) and Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754,
758 (8th Cir. 1971).
100. Cookish, 787 F.2d at 3. The prison inmate in Cookish alleged that he had
been denied adequate medical care and access to the law library. Id. at 2. He also
alleged that the law library was inadequate. Id. Applying the above-cited factors,
the court found a number of reasons to deny the plaintiff's request for counsel.
First, the facts relating to each claim were straightforward. Id. at 3. Second, no
factual dispute arose as to the restrictions placed on the plaintiff's access to the
library. Id. Further, no dispute existed as to the contents of the library. Id. Fi-
nally, the claim did not present any complex factual issues or legal analysis, and
the plaintiff did not demonstrate any functional disability hindering his ability to
present his case. The court thus found that no exceptional circumstances existed
that would justify the appointment of counsel. Id. at 4.
101. See, e.g., Moore v. Mabus, 976 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1992); Whisenant v.
Yuam, 739 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1984).
102. 739 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1984).
103. Id. at 163. In Whisenant, the plaintiff asserted that lack of attention to
serious medical needs deprived him of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at
162. The plaintiff was arrested for murder in a hospital emergency room where he
was seeking treatment for injuries sustained in a motorcycle accident three days
earlier. Id. After being taken to jail, the plaintiff complained of internal bleeding,
but was not given medical attention for nearly twenty-four hours. Id. After exami-
nation by the prison doctor, the plaintiff was taken to the hospital where he re-
ceived eleven units of blood and remained in intensive care for eight days. Id.
After filing suit for violation of his civil rights, the plaintiff made repeated re-
uested for appointment of counsel. Id. The trial court denied these requests on
e grounds that federal funds were not available to compensate appointed coun-
sel. Id. at 163. The court of appeals concluded that the district court's refusal to
appoint counsel constituted an abuse of discretion, notwithstanding the lack of
federal funds. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. Specifically, the court pointed out that, in addition to the fact that
the plaintiff lacked experience with legal procedures, he was barely able to read
and write. Id. Additionally, his incarcerated status made it impossible for him to
leave the prison to interview witnesses. Id. Because of the sharply conflicting testi-
15
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Similarly, in Moore v. Mabus,10 6 the Fifth Circuit found exceptional
circumstances existed where a prisoner alleged mistreatment after testing
positive for the HIV virus.' 0 7 The court found the complex nature of the
issues required professional assistance.' 08 Further, the difficult subject of
AIDS control in a correctional setting exceeded the prisoner's ability to
investigate. 10 9 Finally, the scope of the legal issues and the necessity of
developing expert testimony both required professional trial skills.' 1 0 As
a result of these factors, the court found that exceptional circumstances
existed and directed the district court to appoint counsel."'
C. Less Stringent Standards for Appointment of Counsel
Other circuits have taken a decidedly different approach to the ap-
pointment of counsel for an indigent civil litigant.'1 2 Generally, these
courts take the position that a court should consider a greater number of
factors without reference to the stringent exceptional circumstances stan-
dard. The Seventh Circuit, in Maclin v. Freake," 3 articulated several fac-
mony, the outcome of the case would depend on cross-examination. Id. There-
fore, the plaintiff's lack of training in cross-examination put him at a serious
disadvantage. Id.
106. 976 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1992).
107. Id. at 272. The prisoner in Moore made a number of specific allegations:
(1) deliberate inattention to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment; (2) confinement conditions at the prison in violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment; (3) violation of the prisoner's right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment; (4) loss of certain privileges in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; and
(5) denial of rights guaranteed by state law. Id. at 269.
108. Id. at 272.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. On a similar note, the Eleventh Circuit, also following the standard
of exceptional circumstances, has explained the standard as justifying the appoint-
ment of counsel "where the facts and legal issues are so novel or complex as to
require the assistance of a trained practitioner." Fowler v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1088,
1096 (11th Cir. 1990).
112. See, e.g., Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993) (rejecting con-
clusion that appointment of counsel is only warranted in exceptional circum-
stances), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1306 (1994); Rayes v. Johnson, 969 F.2d 700, 703
(8th Cir.) (providing list of non-exhaustive factors for consideration of appoint-
ment of counsel), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 658 (1992); Long v. Schillinger, 927 F.2d
525, 527 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting that district court should consider variety of
factors when appointing counsel); Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 61 (2d
Cir. 1986) (adopting broader set of factors for appointment of counsel); McCarthy
v. Weinberg, 753 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir. 1985) (embracing broad set of factors for
application under § 1915(d)); McKeever v. Israel, 689 F.2d 1315, 1320 (7th Cir.
1982) (adopting broader Macin factors for appointing counsel); Maclin v. Freake,
650 F.2d 885, 887 (7th Cir. 1981) (noting lack of clear cut standards for appoint-
ment of counsel); Manning v. Lockhart, 623 F.2d 536, 540 (8th Cir. 1980) (finding
appointment of counsel appropriate where question of witness credibility exists
and where allegations of fact are not frivolous); Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754,
758 (8th Cir. 1971) (holding appointment of counsel justified in case where indi-
gent plaintiff could not investigate case).
113. 650 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1981).
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tors to be considered in deciding whether counsel should be
appointed. 114 Using these factors, the court of appeals determined that
the district court's denial of the plaintiff's § 1915(d) request for ap-
pointed counsel constituted an abuse of discretion. 115
In Madin, a paraplegic prisoner sued the prison medical director, al-
leging that intentional disregard of his medical needs violated his Eighth
Amendment rights. 116 The district court denied the plaintiff's request for
counsel. 117 In reviewing this decision, the court of appeals set forth the
factors to be considered. First, the court should consider the merits of the
litigant's claim. 118 If the indigent's chances of prevailing on the merits
are extremely slim, the appointment of counsel may be unwarranted. 119
Next, the court should consider the nature of the factual issues raised,
appointing counsel if the indigent is not in a position to undertake an
investigation. 120 Further, if the only evidence consists of conflicting testi-
mony, the court should appoint counsel' l2 ' Finally, the court should con-
sider not only the capability of the indigent to present the claim, but also
the complexity of the legal issues presented by the claim. 122 The Seventh
Circuit went on to note, however, that this list of factors is by no means
exhaustive and that other elements could also be found significant and
possibly controlling.123
114. Id. at 887-89. For a complete discussion of the Macdin factors, see infra
notes 115-23 and accompanying text.
115. Madin, 650 F.2d at 886.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 887.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 888. The court reasoned that where the only evidence presented
to the fact-finder consists of conflicting testimony, the truth will be more likely
disclosed where both sides are represented by professionals trained in cross-exami-
nation and presentation of evidence. Id.; see also Manning v. Lockhart, 623 F.2d
536 (8th Cir. 1980). In Manning, a prisoner accused the warden of beating him.
Manning, 623 F.2d at 538. The prisoner proceeded pro se as his request for ap-
pointment of counsel was denied. Id. At trial, the sole evidence was the conflict-
ing testimony of the warden and the prisoner. Id. The defendant prevailed at
trial, and the Eighth Circuit reversed. Id. at 540. The Eighth Circuit stated that
where a question of credibility of witnesses exists and where the case presents seri-
ous allegations of fact that are meritorious, denial of a request for appointed coun-
sel constitutes an abuse of discretion. Id.
122. Madin, 650 F.2d at 888-89. In Mactin, a paraplegic alleged he received
no physical therapy for his condition while in prison. Id. at 889. Confined to a
wheelchair, the plaintiff was in no position to investigate the facts of the case. Id.
Additionally, the plaintiff had not demonstrated any working knowledge of the
legal system. Id.
123. Id. at 889. The court did not specifically identify any additional factors
because the factors listed provided an adequate foundation for consideration of
the plaintiff's request for appointed counsel. Id. For further discussion of the
Mactin factors, see Dick, supra note 29, at 651. According to Dick, the court's anal-
ysis in Mactin was entirely reasonable because appointed counsel is not necessary
when the indigent plaintiff's claim is weak, the issues are not complex or the plain-
1994] 1179
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Both the Second and the Eighth Circuits have followed the Maclin
approach.12 4 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
specifically cited the Maclin factors in Hodge v. Police Officers.125 In Hodge,
two police officers were charged with civil rights violations in using exces-
sive force during an arrest. 12 6 The district court denied the plaintiff's
request for counsel, stating that appointment of counsel remains reserved
for cases so complex that they cannot be adequately tried without an attor-
ney.12 7 On appeal, the Second Circuit held that in declining to appoint
counsel, the trial judge failed to apply the correct criteria in exercising her
discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). 128 The factors that should have
been applied, according to the Second Circuit, were those cited by the
Seventh Circuit in Maclin.12 9 The Hodge court also added another poten-
tial factor to consider in determining the appropriate appointment of
counsel for indigent civil litigants under § 1915(d). The court found that
the statutory language requires a preliminary determination of the indi-
gent's inability to obtain counsel before an appointment will be
considered.13 0
The Eighth Circuit has also followed this less stringent approach of
enumerating a number of standards for the court to consider.'3 1 In Rayes
v. Johnson,13 2 the plaintiff, a prisoner at a Nebraska state prison, alleged
that state prison employees intentionally injured him and denied him
tiff has the capability to present the case. Id. at 654. When the Marin factors are
not present, however, courts should be willing to appoint counsel where doing so
will assist the determination of the plaintiff's claim. Id.
124. See, e.g., Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting
that Maclin factors find appropriate middle ground between more and less de-
manding standards); Rayes v.Johnson, 969 F.2d 700, 703 (8th Cir.) (adopting simi-
lar list of factors to apply in appointing counsel), cert. deniid, 113 S. Ct. 658 (1992).
125. 802 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1986).
126. Id. at 59.
127. Id. The court went on to note that this case was relatively straightforward
and would largely turn on the trier of fact's belief in the officer's and the plain-
tiff's credibility. Id.
128. Id. at 59-60.
129. Id. at 60-61 (citing Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885, 887-89 (7th Cir.
1981)). The decision on whether to appoint counsel should include consideration
of the nature of the factual issues presented by the case, the level of investigation
required, the plaintiff's ability to present the case without the assistance of counsel
and the level of complexity of the legal issues involved. Id. Because the trial court
did not apply the proper factors in denying the plaintiff's request for counsel, the
court remanded the case for a proper consideration of the relevant factors. Id. at
62.
130. Id. at 61. The court also stated that an indigent's efforts to obtain coun-
sel should be considered. Id.
131. See, e.g., Rayes v. Johnson, 969 F.2d 700, 703 (8th Cir.) (providing non-
exclusive checklist of factors to be considered in appointment o counsel), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 658 (1992); Manning v. Lockhart, 623 F.2d 536, 540 (8th Cir.
1980) (finding appointment of counsel warranted when case presents serious alle-
gations of fact and question of witness credibility exists).
132. 969 F.2d 700 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 658 (1992).
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medical care.' 3 3 The district court granted the plaintiff's original request
for appointed counsel, but the attorney subsequently withdrew from the
case.13 4 On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the court inappropriately de-
nied him replacement counsel.13 5
Finding the trial court abused its discretion by declining to appoint
substitute counsel, the Eighth Circuit also enunciated the factors to be
considered for the appointment of counsel.13 6 Resembling those cited by
the court in Macin, the important factors include: (1) the plaintiff's need
for an attorney; (2) the plaintiff's ability to retain his own counsel; (3) the
likelihood that the court will benefit from the assistance of counsel; (4)
the factual complexity of the case; (5) the plaintiff's ability to investigate
and present his claim; and (6) the presence of conflicting testimony.13 7
Applying the factors to the case, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the
district court's failure to appoint replacement counsel constituted an
abuse of discretion.' 3 8
IV. ANALvsis
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has only
addressed the issue of appointment of counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)
on three occasions.' 3 9 On each occasion, however, the court addressed
133. Id. at 701. The inmate alleged that prison guards slammed a steel door
on his hand, resulting in a broken finger that medical personnel later refused to
treat. Id. The inmate further alleged that prison guards confiscated his finger
splints on three occasions, thereby interfering with his medical treatment and
causing additional pain. Id.
134. Id. at 702. Along with his motion to withdraw, the attorney filed an affi-
davit that stated that the differences between himself and his client resulted in a
deterioration of the attorney-client relationship to the point where withdrawal was
proper and necessary. Id.
135.. Id. at 702. After withdrawal of the plaintiff's attorney, the magistrate
judge granted the plaintiff sixty days in which to retain another attorney or to
inform the court that he would represent himself. Id. The plaintiff made three
unsuccessful attempts to retain counsel, after which he informed the court that he
would proceed without counsel. Id. Although on two occasions before trial the
plaintiff requested that substitute counsel be appointed, both requests were de-
nied. Id.
136. Id. at 702-03.
137. Id. at 703.
138. Id. Specifically, the court noted that the assistance of counsel was essen-
tial to both the plaintiff's effort to press his claim and the jury's and court's ability
to make a determination on the claim. Id. The plaintiff's particular status as an
inmate hampered his ability to press his claims because of his restricted access to a
typewriter, computer, telephone and law library. Id. Finally, the plaintiff had very
little legal knowledge and the facts and legal issues were sufficiently complex to
warrant the appointment of counsel. Id. at 704.
139. Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 154 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1306 (1994). In Tabron, the court recognized the Third Circuit's lack of guidance
as to what criteria the court should use in deciding to appoint counsel for an indi-
gent civil litigant. Id. at 154. The court noted that the Third Circuit has only
addressed this issue on two other occasions. The first opportunity arose in Ray v.
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different questions within this issue. In Ray v. Robinson,14° the court fo-
cused on the issue of the court's discretion without stating the specific
factors to be considered when appointing counsel.' 41 The Third Circuit
next addressed appointment of counsel issues in Smith-Bey v. Petsock 142
Smith-Bey, however, dealt exclusively with the issue of appealability of an
order denying appointment of counsel. Nevertheless, the Third Circuit
once again failed to guide the courts as to the correct circumstances for
appointment of counsel. 143 Most recently in Tabron v. Grace,144 the court
again addressed the issue of appointment of counsel under § 1915 (d), and
used the opportunity to announce the appropriate standards. 145 Because
each of these cases deals with a separate area of appointment of counsel
under § 1915(d), each will be discussed and analyzed in turn.
A. Discretionay Authority
The Third Circuit has expressly and consistently stated that the dis-
trict courts' authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) is discretionary. 146 The
Third Circuit first addressed the issue of the appointment of counsel for
indigent civil litigants in Ray v. Robinson.147 In that case, prison inmates
alleged that the confinement of inmates to cells of insufficient size and the
prohibition on covering of doors and windows, violated the prisoners' con-
stitutional rights. 148 The district court granted permission for the plain-
tiffs to proceed informa pauperis, after which one of the inmates moved for
appointment of counsel. 14 9 Both the assigned magistrate and the district
court denied the plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel.150
Robinson, 640 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1981). For a discussion of the facts and holding of
Ray, see infra notes 140-41, 147-56 and accompanying text. The second chance
occurred in Smith-Bey v. Petsock, 741 F.2d 22 (3a Cir. 1984). For a discussion of
the facts and holding in Smith-Bey, see infra notes 161-66 and accompanying text.
140. 640 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1981).
141. Id. at 478. The court stated: "Because of the diverse nature of the cases
in which motions to appoint counsel are made, we deem it inadvisable to establish
any general standard as to when counsel should be appointed." Id.
142. 741 F.2d 22 (3d Cir. 1984).
143. Id. at 26. The court simply stated that appointment of counsel is "usually
only granted upon a showing of special circumstances indicating the likelihood of
substantial prejudice." Id.
144. 6 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1306 (1994).
145. Id. at 150. For a discussion of the standards set forth by the Tabron court,
see infra notes 174-86 and accompanying text.
146. See, e.g., Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1306 (1994); Smith-Bey v. Petsock, 741 F.2d 22 (3d Cir. 1984); Ray v. Robinson,
640 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1981).
147. 640 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1981).
148. Id. at 475. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the prison con-
ditions in question constituted infringement of their Eighth Amendment rights
against cruel and unusual punishment. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 475-76. In denying the request, the magistrate stated that because
the Criminal Justice Act does not provide funds for the appointment of counsel to
[Vol. 39: p. 11631182
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In reviewing that denial, the Third Circuit concluded that both rul-
ings overlooked the provisions of § 1915 that provide the court discretion-
ary authority to appoint counsel for an indigent in just such cases. 15 1 The
Ray court cited Peterson v. Nadley'52 and United States v. McQuade'5 3 in sup-
port of this proposition.TM Setting the stage for the court's exercise of
discretion under § 1915(d), the Ray decision gave no guidance as to when
this discretion should be exercised. The court stated that "[b]ecause of
the diverse nature of the cases in which motions to appoint counsel are
made, we deem it inadvisable to establish any general standard as to when
counsel should be appointed." 155 Instead, the court referred to factors
noted in other decisions and expressed no opinion as to whether counsel
should have been appointed in the case at bar. 156
The Third Circuit has consistently followed the approach in Ray,
which stated that the power to appoint counsel under § 1915(d) is discre-
tionary.157 In Smith-Bey, the court implied this power's discretionary na-
ture by noting that on appeal the plaintiff must show that a denial of
appointment of counsel so prejudiced him as to constitute an abuse of
discretion. 158 Likewise, in Tabron, the court stated that § 1915(d) grants
district courts broad discretion to appoint an attorney for indigent civil
prosecute civil rights actions, the plaintiff's motion for the appointment of counsel
should be denied. Id. at 476. According to the district court, "[b]ecause there are
no provisions in law for the appointment of counsel at the expense of the Govern-
ment to prosecute prisoner civil rights actions, the plaintiffs' motion for reconsid-
eration must also be denied." Id.
151. Id. at 477. The circuits generally agree as to this approach. See Rayes v.
Johnson, 969 F.2d 700, 702 (8th Cir.) (explaining that despite lack of constitu-
tional or statutory right to appointed counsel for civil litigants, district court has
discretion to make such appointment), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 658 (1992); Hodge v.
Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that district court judge has
broad discretion to decide whether to appoint counsel under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(d)); Cookish v. Cunningham, 787 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1986) (giving district
court discretion to appoint counsel for indigent civil litigant under § 1915(d));
McCarthy v. Weinberg, 753 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir. 1985) (emphasizing that dis-
trict court is vested with considerable discretion regarding appointment of counsel
under § 1915(d)); Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 1984) (stating
that power to appoint counsel under § 1915(d) is discretionary one); McKeever v.
Israel, 689 F.2d 1315, 1318 (7th Cir. 1982) (expressing view that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(d) clearly grants district courts broad discretion to appoint counsel for in-
digents); Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885, 886 (7th Cir. 1981) (granting district
court broad discretion to appoint counsel for indigents under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(d)); Ray v. Robinson, 640 F.2d 474, 477 (3d Cir. 1981) (noting that
§ 1915(d) gives the district court discretion to appoint counsel).
152. 452 F.2d 754 (8th Cir. 1971). For further discussion of Peterson, see supra
notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
153. 579 F.2d 1180, 1181 (9th Cir. 1978). For further discussion of McQuade,
see supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
154. Ray, 640 F.2d at 477-78.
155. Id. at 478.
156. Id. (citing Peterson v. Nader, 452 F.2d 754, 757-58 (8th Cir. 1971)).
157. Id. at 477.
158. Smith-Bey v. Petsock, 741 F.2d 22, 25 (3d Cir. 1984).
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litigants. 159 Thus, the Third Circuit has maintained the firm position that
the power to appoint counsel under § 1915(d) remains discretionary.
B. Appealability
The Ray court also addressed the issue of appealability; finding that
an order denying counsel constituted a collateral order, and therefore was
immediately appealable. 160 Nevertheless, the Third Circuit overruled this
part of the decision three years later when it decided Smith-Bey.' 6 ' Smith-
Bey involved a civil rights action filed in district court against'numerous
prison employees and officers.162 The district court granted the plaintiff
informa pauperis status, but denied his request for counsel sought under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(d).163 Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in lanagan
v. United States,' 64 the court concluded that decision effectively overruled
the Third Circuit's prior position on the same issue in Ray.165 As a result,
the Third Circuit reversed its position in Ray and held that an order deny-
159. Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1306 (1994).
160. Ray, 640 F.2d at 476. The Ray court reached this conclusion by applying
the factors enumerated by the United States Supreme Court in Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981). In Firestone, the Supreme Court held
that a district court's order refusing to disqualify counsel .is not appealable prior to
final judgment in the litigation. Id. at 379. Such an order could not qualify as a
collateral order to avoid the dictates of the final judgment rule. Id. at 376. The
Court defined a collateral order as one that conclusively decides the question in
dispute, settles an important issue separately from the merits and is effectively un-
reviewable on appeal. Id. at 375 (citing Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S.
463, 468 (1978)). The Ray court concluded that the Firestone test is satisfied by an
order denying counsel. Id. at 476. The first part meets the collateral order test
because the sole issue involves the district court's authority to appoint counsel for
civil litigants. Id. at 476-77. According to the Ray court, the question of appoint-
ment of counsel is separate from the merits of the case, thus satisfying the second
part of the test. Id. at 477. Finally, the facts meet the third part of the test because
no meaningful review of an order denying appointment of counsel could occur
once the trial had concluded. Id. The Ray court reasoned that a determination of
an appellant's need for an attorney would have to be made before trial to have any
useful impact. Id. As a result, the Third Circuit in Ray held that denial of counsel
constitutes an appealable collateral order. Id.
161. Smith-Bey, 741 F.2d at 26.
162. Id. at 22. The complaint charged that the defendants violated the plain-
tiff's rights by failing to follow his instructions to send by certified mail an envel-
ope containing legal papers. Id. Additionally, an amount attributed to the cost of
the certified mail was deducted from his inmate account. Id. The plaintiff sought
a declaratory judgment that these acts violated his constitutional right of access to
the courts. Id.
163. Id. at 22. According to the magistrate, to whom the case had been re-
ferred, appointment of counsel would not further the litigation. Id. The magis-
trate then stated the court's policy of limiting a plaintiff's request for appointed
counsel to cases in which the plaintiff lacks the capacity to represent himself ade-
quately. Id. at 23.
164. 465 U.S. 259 (1984). For further discussion of FZanagan and its holding,
see supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
165. Smith-Bey, 741 F.2d at 23-25.
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ing appointment of counsel fails to meet the requirements of the collat-
eral order doctrine and therefore is not immediately appealable. 166
C. Criteria for the Appointment of Counsel
The Smith-Bey decision almost exclusively concerned the issue of ap-
pealability. As in Ray, the court gave little guidance as to the factors to be
considered in determining whether to appoint counsel for an indigent
civil litigant. The court merely stated that the appointment of counsel
under § 1915(d) is usually granted only upon a showing of special circum-
stances.167 Such special circumstances would indicate the probability of
substantial prejudice to the indigent.' 68 Prejudice could result, for exam-
ple, from the indigent's inability to present the facts and legal issues to the
court in a complex case without assistance of counsel.' 69
In 1993, the Third Circuit finally announced the factors to be consid-
ered for the appointment of counsel under § 1915(d) in Tabron v.
Grac17° In Tabron, a prisoner brought suit against eight prison officials,
claiming a violation of constitutional rights. 171 The trial court denied the
plaintiff's request for counsel, stating that counsel may only be appointed
to represent indigent civil litigants in exceptional circumstances.' 72 The
Third Circuit disagreed, finding that § 1915(d) does not limit the appoint-
ment of counsel to exceptional circumstances. 173
166. Id. at 26.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. Noting the difference between criminal and civil cases, the court
pointed out that the Sixth Amendment requires appointment of counsel only for
an indigent criminal defendant. Id. The court further stated that with respect to
appealability, civil and criminal cases remain identical. Id.
170. 6 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1306 (1994).
171. Id. at 150. Specifically, the plaintiff charged that the officials had vio-
lated his civil rights by failing to protect him from an assault by another prisoner.
Id.
172. Id. at 151. The case was assigned to a magistrate judge for pretrial pro-
ceedings. Id. The plaintiff filed a motion for appointment of counsel on the
grounds that he lacked the necessary legal education and experience to present
the case properly. Id. The plaintiff further argued that an attorney was needed to
assist him with discovery. Id. Finding no exceptional circumstances existed tojus-
tify the appointment of counsel, the magistrate denied the motion. Id.
173. Id. at 155. The court stated: "Section 1915(d) provides that '[t]he court
may request an attorney to represent any such person unable to employ counsel.'
Nothing in this clear language suggests that appointment is permissible only in
some limited set of circumstances." Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988)).
The Tabron court rejected the defendants' contention that the reference to "spe-
cial circumstances" in Smith-Bey indicated that the magistrate was correct in apply-
ing the exceptional circumstances standard. Id. at 154. Instead, the court
concluded that Smith-Bey merely stated in dicta that the power to appoint counsel
under § 1915(d) is discretionary and that appointment is "usually only granted upon
a showing of special circumstances." Id. (quoting Smith-Bey v. Petsock, 741 F.2d
22, 26 (3d Cir. 1984)).
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Perhaps more importantly, the Tabron court announced factors ap-
propriate in deciding whether to appoint counsel under section 1915(d)
in the Third Circuit.' 74 In setting forth these factors, the Tabron court
expressly rejected the exceptional circumstances approach of the First,
Fourth, Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits.' 75 The court noted the lan-
guage of the statute and concluded that "[niothing in [the] clear lan-
guage suggests that appointment is permissible only in some limited set of
circumstances."176
The Third Circuit relied heavily on the general standards set forth by
the Second and Seventh Circuits, expressly adopting these standards in
Tabron.17 7 As a threshold matter, a court must consider the merits of the
plaintiff's claim.178 Once the district court determines the claim's merit,
the court should consider the plaintiff's ability to present his or her
case. 179 The Third Circuit also noted that if an indigent plaintiff is found
to be incapable of presenting a meritorious claim, the court should seri-
ously consider appointing counsel. 8 0
174. Id. The district court specifically referred to the lack of guidance in the
Third Circuit and noted that in the Ray decision the Third Circuit did not elabo-
rate on the particular standards the courts should apply when exercising discretion
under § 1915(d). Id. at 154. The court stated that this case offered an opportunity
to explain the appropriate standards for appointment under § 1915(d). Id. at 150.
175. Id. at 155. The court based this rejection on the grounds that the excep-
tional circumstances approach imposes a substantive limitation on the district
courts' discretion to appoint counsel. Id. Cases specifically relied upon by the
defendants and rejected by the Third Circuit included: Lavado v. Keohane, 992
F.2d 601 (6th Cir. 1993); Fowler v.Jones, 899 F.2d 1088 (11th Cir. 1990); Cookish
v. Cunningham, 787 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089 (9th
Cir. 1980); Cook v. Bounds, 518 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1975). Tabron, 6 F.3d at 155.
For a discussion of the holdings and the standards applied in these cases, see supra
notes 76-100 and accompanying text.
176. Tabron, 6 F.3d at 155.
177. Id. Specifically, the court relied heavily upon Hodge v. Police Officers,
802 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1986) and Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1981). In
so doing, the court indicated that it was elaborating on the specific criteria to be
considered under the 'special circumstances' approach previously announced in
the Third Circuit. Id.; see also Smith-Bey v. Petsock, 741 F.2d 22, 26 (3d Cir. 1984).
For a discussion of the Second Circuit's approach to appointment of counsel, see
supra also notes 125-30 and accompanying text. For an examination of the Seventh
Circuit's approach to the same issue, see supra notes 113-23 and accompanying
text.
178. Tabron, 6 F.3d at 155. The court cited Maclin for the proposition that a
court is justified in appointing counsel only if it first appears that the litigant's
claim has some merit in fact or law. Id.
179. Id. at 156. In determining a plaintiff's ability, a number of factors are
considered, namely the plaintiff's education, prior litigation experience and prior
work experience. Id. The plaintiff's ability to present his or her case may also
depend on such factors as the ability to speak English and the restraints placed on
the plaintiff if he or she is a prisoner. Id. (citing Castillo v. Cook County Mail
Room Department, 990 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1993) and Rayes v. Johnson, 969 F.2d
700 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 658 (1992)). For a discussion of Rayes, see
supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
180. Tabron, 6 F.3d at 156.
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The court went on to note a number of other key factors. The diffi-
culty of the particular legal issues and the level of factual investigation that
will be required should be considered.1 8 1 Problems faced by confined
prisoners in pursuing their claims may also be evaluated.18 2 Appointment
of counsel may be warranted in a case likely to require extensive discovery
or compliance with complicated discovery rules.' 8 3 Finally, if a case likely
turns on credibility determinations, appointment of counsel may also be
justified.' 8 4 The Third Circuit concluded by noting that the appointment
of counsel could be made at any point in the litigation and could be made
by the district court sua sponte.185 As a final note, the court pointed out
that the list was not meant to be exhaustive. The court emphasized that
appointment of counsel under § 1915(d) remains a matter within the trial
court's sound discretion. 186
Concluding its discussion of the issue of appointment of counsel
under § 1915(d), the court noted the ever-increasing number of prisoner
civil rights actions filed each year, the shortage of funds to compensate
appointed counsel and the lack of competent attorneys willing to under-
take such representation. 18 7 In light of these concerns, a more stringent
181. Id. According to the court, the more complex the legal issues, the more
inclined a court should be to appoint counsel. Id. The rationale for this position
implies that justice is best served when both sides of a complex legal issue are
represented by trained lawyers. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. The court reasoned that "when witness credibility is a key issue, 'it is
more likely that the truth will be exposed where both sides are represented by
those trained in the presentation of evidence and in cross examination.'" Id.
(quoting Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885, 888 (7th Cir. 1981)).
185. Id. As a result, even if the indigent plaintiff's incapacity to present the
case did not appear until trial, the court should nevertheless consider appointing
counsel at that point. Id. at 157. The Third Circuit cautioned, however, that the
courts must always consider whether an indigent plaintiff could retain counsel on
his own behalf. Id. at 157 n.5. If the plaintiff could easily attain or afford counsel,
but has simply made no effort to do so, the court should not appoint counsel. Id.
186. Id. at 157. As a result, a district court's refusal to appoint counsel under
§ 1915(d) is reviewable by an appeals court for abuse of discretion. Id. at 158.
Additionally, where the district court has failed to articulate the reasons for such
refusal, remanding the case may be necessary to determine whether the district
court applied the appropriate standard. Id. Because the magistrate judge in
Tabron applied the incorrect standard and offered no reasons for denying the
plaintiff's request for counsel, the case was remanded for consideration of the
issue of appointment of counsel under the appropriate standards. Id. Applying
the newly-announced factors to the case at bar, however, the court suggested that a
number of factors would be relevant on remand. First, the plaintiff in Tabron
would be forced to deal with complex discovery rules, and would be at a distinct
disadvantage due to his lack of legal experience. Id. The plaintiff's lack of legal
experience was also important because there was controversy in the testimony of
several witnesses and thus, the case would turn on credibility determinations. Id.
Finally, the plaintiff's incarcerated status could have hampered his ability to inves-
tigate the facts. Id. The court also noted, however, that the plaintiff appeared
capable and literate, and that the legal issues did not appear complex. Id.
187. Id. at 157.
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approach, such as the exceptional circumstances approach rejected by the
court, would seem more appropriate. The court, however, noted with op-
timism the growing number of attorneys willing to provide pro bono legal
services for indigent litigants and encouraged more lawyers to volunteer
for such service in order to address these concerns.1 88 Instead of making
a ruling based only on policy, the Third Circuit chose an approach consis-
tent with that of various other circuits; the court found that the clear lan-
guage of § 1915(d) does not impose a strict limitation of exceptional
circumstances on the appointment of counsel for indigent civil
litigants. 189
V. CONCLUSION
While no constitutional or statutory right to appointed counsel exists
in a civil case, § 1915(d) gives federal courts the authority to appoint coun-
sel for indigent civil litigants. 190 The Third Circuit in Tabron v. Grace ex-
pressly rejected the exceptional circumstances approach adopted by some
circuits in favor of a less stringent set of factors to guide the court in ap-
pointing counsel. The Third Circuit's approach provides the court with
more factors to consider when deciding whether to appoint counsel. Such
appropriate consideration of all relevant factors is particularly important
because an order denying appointment of counsel is not immediately ap-
pealable in the Third Circuit. Furthermore, by providing more factors for
consideration, the Third Circuit's approach may increase the number of
appointments of counsel for indigent civil litigants. Because appointment
of counsel has been said to have the effect of actually expediting cases, 19 1
this may help relieve the burden on the federal courts caused by the in-
188. Id.
189. Id. at 155. For a list of the cases following the same approach as the
Third Circuit, see supra note 112.
190. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988).
191. Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 662 F.2d 1301, 1309 n.20 (9th Cir. 1981).
In Bradshaw, the Ninth Circuit stated that representation conducted by counsel is
"more orderly, rational and reasonable." Id.; see also Eisenberg, supra note 1, at
475. According to Eisenberg, counsel should be appointed in every case that has
survived sua sponte dismissal and jurisdictional problems. Eisenberg noted that be-
yond this point, no pro se plaintiff has the ability to represent himself against exper-
ienced counsel. Id. Removing the unmeritorious and frivolous claims as soon as
possible constitutes the key to providing counsel in the appropriate cases. Id. Ac-
cording to the author, roughly 10%-20% of prisoner civil rights cases would be
able to withstand this inquiry and require counsel. Id.; see also Weygandt, supra
note 75, at 1569. According to Weygandt, the efficiency issue directly relates to the
appealability of § 1915(d) denials. Immediate review of orders denying appoint-
ment of counsel will promote efficiency. Id. An indigent plaintiff's successfu in-
terlocutory appeal avoids a new trial, while the remainder of the action is carried
out more efficiently with the assistance of counsel. Id. For a discussion of the
disadvantages faced by pro se litigants and the resulting delays in the litigation pro-
cess, see Donald H. Zeigler & Michele G. Hermann, The Invisible Litigant: An Inside
View of Pro Se Actions in the Federal Courts, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 157, 202-05 (1972).
1188 [Vol. 39: p. 1163
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creasing number of civil actions filed each year. 192 . Most importantly, the
Third Circuit's flexible approach will more adequately fulfill the vision of
the drafters of § 1915(d), that of providing equal access to the courts for
all citizens.
Kimberly A. Owens
192. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 435, 466. Eisenberg notes that between 1972
and 1991, the number of prisoner civil rights cases has grown from 3,000 to 26,000.
Id. at 435. Additionally, in the last twenty-five years, the overall civil caseload in
district courts has tripled. Id. at 466. Specifically, the total number of civil filings
in U.S. district courts in 1991 was 207,610. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS 2 (1993). In 1992, this
figure rose 8% to reach 224,747. Id. In 1993, civil filings increased an additional
2% to reach 228,162. Id. The key contributing factors in the overall increase in
1993 civil filings included: prisoner petitions (up 16%), civil rights (up 14%), per-
sonal injury product liability (up 34%) and Social Security cases (up 22%). Id. at
3.
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